In this note we consider a class of environmental games recently proposed in the literature and investigate them by using the powerful tools of variational inequalities. We also consider the case where some data of the problem can depend on a parameter and analyze the regularity of the solution with respect to the parameter. In view of applications to time-dependent or random models, we also introduce the variational inequality formulation in Lebesgue spaces.
Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a growing interest in the application of game theory to environmental problems. At an international level, the Durban conference (2011) has revived the importance of global agreements (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol) which require that each signatory country bounds its polluting emission to a prefixed level. Among the vaste literature on environmental games, here we recall that the game theory formulation of Kyoto Protocol has been introduce by Breton et al. [1] in the case of two players, while an n-players environmental game has been formulated by Tidball and Zaccour [2] for a broad class of revenue and damage cost functions. In this paper we further investigate two scenarios proposed in [2] :
1) The noncooperative scenario where each player optimizes their welfare under their own environmental constraints. The players interact through the damage cost, which is a function of the total emission. In this case a solution is a Nash equilibrium.
2) The umbrella (or bubble) scenario, where the players aim to optimize their individual welfare, but under a shared environmental constraint. In this case a solution is a generalized Nash equilibrium, à la Rosen. We study these two scenarios via the variational inequalities theory which has proved to be a very powerful tool in the theoretical and numerical analysis of many equilibrium problems (see e.g. [3] [4] [5] ). We first compare the total emissions resulting from the two scenarios, taking explicitely into account the nonnegativity constraints which, for the sake of simplicity, were relaxed in [2] .
Then, we consider the case where the operator or the constraints set depend on a parameter, and study the continuity and Lipschitz continuity of the solution with respect to the parameter (see e.g. [6, 7] ). This parameter can have the meaning of time, or of a random variable reflecting the uncertainty in the decision variables. Finally, we introduce the Lebesgue space formulation which was successfully applied to tackle time-dependent as well as random equilibrium problems, [8] [9] [10] [11] .
The Model and the Variational Inequality Approach
Each player is a subject who produces, pollutes and aims to maximize his/her welfare function, which is defined as the difference between the revenue resulting from the production and the damage cost due to pollution. As usual we assume that pollution is proportional to the industrial output so that the revenue of player i, , can be expressed as a function of its polluting emission i . Let us denote by
f e the revenue function of player , which is assumed to be nonnegative, increasing, concave and . Assume that the cost of the environmental damage depends on the emissions of all players and denote these functions by 1 i n . Each is assumed nonnegative, increasing, convex and . Thus, the welfare function of player is given by: 
Under the differentiability hypotheses, it is well known (see e.g. [12] ) that Nash equilibrium problems are equivalent to variational inequalities. Thus, consider the closed convex set    : 0 , 1, ,
where and let be defined by: 
In the sequel we shall refer to the above variational inequality as (NVI). Assume that F is a monotone operator i.e.:
In particular, assume that F is strictly monotone in the sense that equality in (3) holds only if e e  . Since F is continuous and is compact, the Stampacchia theorem applies and (NVI) is solvable (for a survey on existence theorems for variational inequalities see [13] ). Moreover the solution is unique under the strict monotonicity hypothesis.  , but the constraints are satisfied jointly by all players. We are then faced with a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), that is the problem of finding
This class of problems was introduced by Rosen in his seminal paper [14] and has been studied quite recently from the point of view of variational inequalities [15] . It is well known that GNEPs have infinite solutions and the problem of selecting certain interesting classes of solutions was already considered by Rosen who introduced the concept of normalized equilibrium. Here we follow and generalize the approach of [15] . Let us fix a vector of positive weights
, introduce the operator defined by:
and the closed and convex set:
Consider the following variational inequality problem (RVI): Find
For each fixed vector of weights r this variational inequality admits a unique solution R e , (since r F is strictly monotone), which is the norma ed Rosen uilibrium corresponding to the given weight. For the economic interpretation of normalized equilibria we refer the interested reader to [2] and to the quoted paper by Rosen. Here we would like to remark that the variational inequality formulation provides a wealth of effective algorithms for the computation of Rosen equilibria. 
Comparison between Nash and Rosen
.
Thus, Nash parametric variational inequality is the following problem: for a.e.
, while Rosen parametric varia equality reads as follows. For a.e. tional in- 
), denotes the jection
Then f (7), (   R e t of (8) see [7] . Now we want to formulate our problems in Lebesgue spaces. For the sake of simplicity we confine ourselves to the Hilbert space
We shall work under the following set of assumptions:
by applying Lebesgue convergence theorem. In this framework, the Nash equilibrium problem is to find :
Rosen Equilibrium problem is to find :
Once we have formulated Nash and Rosen equilibrium problems in the Lebesgue space we are in position to write the corresponding two variational inequalities:
Find 
Conclusion
In this short note we showed how some environm models recently proposed can be formulated via the Moreover, we extended the dmitting the possibility that both the previous models a operator and the constraints sets depend on a parameter. The variational inequality approach permits the application of some recent geometric-analytic methods ( [6, 7] ) to study the sensitivity of the solution with respect to perturbations of the parameter. At last, we introduced the Lebesgue-space formulation of the problems under study, which, in the last decade, has been very fruitful to study time-dependent and random equilibrium problems (see e.g. [9, 11, 16] for the approximate computation of statistical quantities related to the solution). In this respect, Inequalities (11) and (12) (and their generalization to probability spaces) are the starting point for a systematic study of environmental problems which we are planning to carry out in the future.
